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ABSTRACT 
 
Trust relationships occur naturally in many diverse 
contexts such as collaborative systems, e-commerce, 
interpersonal interactions, social networks, and semantic 
sensor web. As agents providing content and services 
become increasingly removed from the agents that 
consume them, the issue of robust trust inference and 
update becomes critical. There is a need to find online 
substitutes for traditional (direct or face-to-face) cues to 
derive measures of trust, and create efficient and robust 
systems for managing trust in order to support decision-
making. Unfortunately, there is neither a universal notion 
of trust that is applicable to all domains nor a clear 
explication of its semantics or computation in many 
situations. We motivate the trust problem, explain the 
relevant concepts, summarize research in modeling trust 
and gleaning trustworthiness, and discuss challenges 
confronting us. The goal is to provide a comprehensive 
broad overview of the trust landscape, with the nitty-
gritties of a handful of approaches. We also provide 
details of the theoretical underpinnings and comparative 
analysis of Bayesian approaches to binary and multi-
level trust, to automatically determine trustworthiness in 
a variety of   reputation systems including those used in 
sensor networks, e-commerce, and collaborative 
environments. Ultimately, we need to develop expressive 
trust networks that can be assigned objective semantics. 
 
KEYWORDS: trust vs. reputation, trust ontology, 
gleaning trustworthiness, trust metrics and models 
(propagation: chaining and aggregation), social and 
sensor networks, collaborative systems, trust system 
attacks, beta-PDF, Dirichlet distribution, binary and 
multi-level trust.   
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Trust relationships occur naturally in many diverse 
contexts such as collaborative systems, e-commerce, 
social interactions, (semantic) social networks, mobile ad 
hoc networks (MANETs), distributed systems, decision-
support systems, and (semantic) sensor web. As the 
connections and interactions between humans and/or 
machines (collectively called agents) evolve, and as the 
agents providing content and services become 
increasingly removed from the agents that consume them, 
and as miscreants attempt to attack existing infrastructure, 
the issue of robust trust inference and update (collectively 
called trust management) becomes critical. There is no 
dearth of trust frameworks in the literature to represent 
and reason with trust information. However, use of these 
frameworks for trust computation in practice requires 
specification of how to glean (direct) trustworthiness 
values, determination of context-based trust thresholds, 
and justification of rules for (indirect/inferred) trust 
propagation (via chaining and aggregation), in the 
application context [1][2]. Even though trust is central to 
meaningful collaboration among machines, or among 
humans, or between machines and humans, there is 
neither a universal notion of trust that is applicable to all 
domains nor a clear explication of its semantics or 
computation in many situations. Furthermore, because 
Web, social networks and sensors often provide 
complementary and overlapping information about an 
activity or event that are critical for overall situational 
awareness, there is a unique need for developing an 
understanding of and techniques for managing trust that 
span all these information channels.  
 
Towards filling some of the gaps in automating trust 
inference, we studied several Bayesian approaches to 
trust that are broadly applicable to machine and social 
sensor networks, MANETs, recommender systems, 
collaborative environments, etc. Ironically, a large 
number of approaches that develop Bayesian basis for 
trust using Beta probability distribution function (Beta-
PDF) do not coincide when we look at the details. Our 
comparative analysis of several notable approaches to 
trust formation and evolution revealed that there are 
significant differences in the nature of trust information 
these frameworks represent, in the details of trust 
composition rules, and their overall robustness. 
Furthermore, there are a number of situations where 
binary trust is restrictive and graded trust level 
information (e.g., poor, fair, good, very good, excellent) 
is available. So we discuss the generalization to multi-
level trust and review several practical applications. We 
also discovered errors in an existing formalization of 
multi-level trust evolution, which we use to better 
motivate the mathematical basis for multi-level trust. 
Specifically, we summarize our findings and discuss 
formalization of multi-level trust based on Dirichlet 
distribution that generalizes Bayesian approaches to 
binary trust based on Beta-PDF and overcomes the 
capricious behavior of some of the existing Bayesian 
approaches to multi-level trust. To elucidate our approach, 
we present an algorithm for computing trust evolution on 
concrete examples that is intuitively satisfactory and that 
is robust with respect to well-known (trust system) 
attacks. The evaluation based on example traces obtained 
by experimenting with this algorithm seems more 
insightful than the traditional simulation studies that seem 
to confirm the obvious aggregate behavior. We also 
discuss existing works that apply Dirichlet distribution 
for formalizing multi-dimensional trust and for 
collaboration. 
 
The objectives of this work are: (i) to illustrate the nature 
of trust occurring in different domains to rationalize why 
there is no universal notion of trust; (ii) to explain the 
details of Bayesian approaches to binary and multi-
valued trust for automatic trust computation (that is, 
gleaning direct trust from first-hand interactions and then 
composing them to obtain indirect/inferred trust); (iii) to 
provide a comparative analysis and distributed trust 
computation algorithm for Bayesian approaches to trust 
in the context of sensor networks, to underscore the 
inherent complexity and subtlety involved in formalizing 
trust; and (iv) to provide a comprehensive discussion of 
attacks on trust systems. Specifically, this work 
constructively demonstrates that providing probabilistic 
basis to trust networks is still open to multiple 
interpretations, and substantiates how seemingly similar 
approaches differ from each other in non-trivial ways. 
For completeness, we recapitulate the fundamental 
concepts and terminology used in the trust literature, 
explaining their inter-relationships and distinctions. Our 
work complements several existing surveys on trust and 
reputation systems such as [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], 
[10], and [11]. Specifically, Marsh [3] presents an 
informal, qualitative analysis of the general notion of 
trust, and then develops a theory of computational trust. 
Unfortunately, the formalization is hard to apply in 
practice because of the difficulties in estimating 
numerical values for various parameters required by it. 
Grandison and Sloman [4] discuss trust classification and 
illustrate policy-based trust management in the context of 
sharing Internet resources and services. Artz and Gil [5] 
categorize published trust work abstractly under policy-
based trust, reputation-based trust, general models of trust, 
or as addressing trust in information sources. Josang et al. 
[6] explain various trust concepts and summarizes 
practical trust and reputation systems for e-commerce. 
Yu et al. [7] presents a survey of trust and reputation 
management systems in wireless communication. 
Golbeck et al. [12] and Golbeck [13] explore trust 
representation and reasoning in social networks, 
specifically, computation and application of binary and 
continuous trust ratings. In the context of sensor networks, 
Buchegger and Le Boudec [8] propose and analyze a 
message-level protocol (called CONFIDANT) that 
detects and isolates misbehaving sensor network nodes, 
in order to improve the robustness and the performance 
of dynamic network packet routing, while Momani and 
Challa [10] provide a broad survey of trust in network 
domain distinguishing between security and trust, and 
providing a description of attacks at the network and 
packet level. In contrast, we discuss fewer approaches but 
in more depth, and focus on attacks on the trust system. 
Hussain et al. [9] provide a short qualitative summary of 
four different approaches to trust that embody Bayesian 
networks, and point out their shared short comings. Our 
work is a more substantial analysis of the related 
approaches. The recently published work, Govindan and 
Mohapatra [11], is a comprehensive survey of trust 
computing methods and trust dynamics in MANETs. 
Specifically, it provides a broad coverage of trust 
literature and attacks as it relates to MANETs. However, 
our detailed comparative analysis of binary trust utilizing 
our trust ontology concepts in Section 5, the precise 
analysis of why Quercia et al.’s B-Trust approach to 
multi-valued trust is problematic, the detailed 
development of a satisfactory approach to multi-valued 
trust in Section 6, and the illustration of different trust 
application areas are complementary to Govindan and 
Mohapatra [11]. The current paper extends Thirunarayan 
and Anantharam [14] (which is a broad tutorial 
introduction to trust networks) with a comprehensive 
theory and implementation of multi-valued trust using 
Dirichlet distribution.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we 
provide examples to motivate the trust problem. In 
Section 3, we elucidate characteristics of trust and 
explain related concepts. In Section 4, we discuss our 
trust ontology. In Section 5, we summarize trust research 
by showing illustrative examples of how to glean 
trustworthiness. These results may be adapted for 
different collaboration contexts. In Section 6, we further 
elaborate on the existing Bayesian Approaches to binary 
and multi-level trust, including using Dirichlet 
distribution, due to its practical importance and 
widespread use. We also discuss various applications.  In 
Section 7, we recapitulate our findings.   
 
2. MOTIVATION 
 
We present real-life examples to underscore the 
fundamental nature of trust problem. 
 
2.1. Trust in Multiple Domains 
 
Interpersonal Networks 
 
• With which neighbor should we leave our children over 
the weekend when we are required to be at the hospital? 
 
• Who should be named as a guardian for our children in 
our Will? 
 
Note that (i) there is uncertainty and incompleteness in 
our knowledge about the unraveling situation, (ii) there is 
not only an expectation of a good outcome but also 
concern about a bad outcome, and (iii) there is a need for 
immediate action. Furthermore, the threshold for trust in 
the second case is significantly higher than the threshold 
for the first case. 
  
Social Networks 
 
 
The first author received the above email purportedly 
from the collaborator. Is this a genuine request, or a trap? 
This doubt arose because, in the past, we have 
collaborated using only Google Docs, and TitanPad was 
unfamiliar, and there was an urgent need to edit the 
shared document. 
 
Similarly, one always has a nagging feeling about 
clicking on http://bit.ly-URL, or about relying on a 
product review (when only a few reviews are present). 
 
Sensor Networks 
 
Given a weather sensor network-based prediction of a 
potential tornado in the vicinity of a city, should we 
mobilize emergency response teams ahead of time? 
 
This really depends on how much trust we have in the 
reliability of sensor nodes and the collaborative nature of 
the task. 
 
When a van’s TCS (Traction Control System) indicator 
light comes on intermittently, is the indicator light faulty 
or the traction control system? Similarly, when a van’s 
Check Engine light comes on, is indicator light faulty or 
the transmission?  
 
This again depends on how various subsystem functions 
are monitored. In fact, in our van’s case, the TCS 
indicator light and the transmission were faulty. 
 
Summarizing Examples  
 
Trust/reputation systems provide mechanisms for soft 
security, in contrast with authentication and access 
control mechanisms that constitute hard security. In 
MANETs, trust enables dynamic determination of 
trustworthy routes, improving throughput and robustness 
against malicious nodes. Note that secure key 
distribution/authentication does not obviate the need for 
trust inference in case an attacker is able to subvert 
security mechanisms and somehow enter the network. In 
sensor networks, trust enables improving overall 
reliability and avoiding misbehaving nodes due to faults 
or transient vagaries of the environment. In cognitive 
radio networks, trust enables picking less noisy and less 
crowded channels. In e-Commerce, aggregated reputation 
promotes reward for honesty and penalty for deceit. In 
the context of Web, source trust can be crucial for result 
set ranking, data integration and conflict resolution. In 
collaborative environments, trust can be used to select, 
monitor and gauge suitability of a partner. Trust is also 
fundamental to interpersonal communication and social 
transactions.  
  
In the context of applications that involve both humans 
and sensors systems, it is crucial to have trustworthy 
aggregation of all data and control actions. For example, 
the 2002 Uberlingen mid-air collision
1
 occurred because 
the pilot of one of the planes trusted the human air traffic 
controller (who was ill-informed about the unfolding 
situation), instead of the electronic TCAS system (which 
was providing conflicting but correct course of action to 
avoid collision). See Investigation Report AZ001-1-2, 
German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents 
Investigation, 2004. 
 
                                                 
1
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Uberlingen_mid-air_collision  
(accessed 10/23/2012) 
–SUBJECT: [TitanPad] Amit Sheth invited you to 
an EtherPad document. 
–CONTENT: View it here:    
  http://knoesis.titanpad.com/200  
 
2.2. Common Issues Related to Trust  
 
Trust inference is necessary for action in diverse 
situations, subject to uncertainty and potential for loss. In 
all the above examples and collaborative tasks, we have a 
Trustor who must choose whether and how much to trust 
a Trustee, an Action by which the trustor is choosing to 
be vulnerable to the trustee based on an assessment of 
trustee’s nature, and a Context in which the potential 
negative consequences of betrayal outweigh any 
perceived positive results [15]. Besides context, time also 
plays an important part in determining and updating trust 
due to the dynamic nature of interactions and behavior 
evolution. 
 
There are two sides to trust management: Trustor 
assesses trustee for dependability in a given context and 
then decides to act accordingly. On the other hand, 
trustee tries to come across in a positive light about its 
suitability, reliability, and quality of service. 
 
In general, we track trust in order to: (i)  
predict future behavior; (ii) incentivize “good” behavior 
and discourage “bad” behavior; and (iii) detect malicious 
entities. 
 
2.3. Distinguishing Issues Related to Trust 
Networks 
 
We will use the term machine networks to lump together 
MANETs, sensor networks, cognitive radio networks, 
etc., social networks to lump together social media, social 
sensors/crowd-sourcing, e-commerce rating/review 
systems, recommender systems, collaborative 
environments, etc., and interpersonal networks to refer to 
people to people interactions. In interpersonal networks, 
trust is often subjective, while in machine networks, trust 
can be given an objective basis and approximated by 
trustworthiness. Social networks straddle these two 
extremes, so trust issues span the whole gamut as it 
applies to them. For example, a trustor may not know a 
trustee in a social sensing context (cf. Twitter), while a 
trustor may know trustee’s relative level of competence 
and honesty in other contexts (cf. Facebook). Here, we do 
not address the issue of trust in the context of the web of 
documents (HTML Web) and the web of data (Semantic 
Web). 
 
There is a large body of work proposing different trust 
frameworks for pervasive computational trust 
management that must be instantiated and customized for 
each specific application. In (Facebook-like) social 
networks and interpersonal networks, the justification for 
taking this framework-based approach is to accommodate 
subjectivity in dealing with uncertainty and varied 
context of use, due to differences in trustor’s experiences, 
intensions, trust thresholds (that depend  on risk tolerance 
and mitigating factors such as warranties and insurance), 
circle of recommenders, and alternative sources to satisfy 
the goal. Therefore, by its very nature, social interaction-
based interpersonal trust is not amenable to automatic 
trust assessment, even though manual analysis can be 
used to elucidate important factors that influence decision 
making. On the contrary, in machine networks and in 
social networks that require determination of 
trustworthiness entirely from the overt behavior of a 
trustee, we need to pursue formalization of trust metrics 
and inferences that take into account context-dependent 
trust thresholds. Interaction-based trust inference can 
allow identification of nodes that are faulty, misbehaving 
(due to environmental effects) or malicious in machine 
networks, and sources that are prejudiced, ignorant, or 
malicious in crowd-sourced social networks. 
 
3. TRUST-RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
We recapitulate well-known definitions of trust concepts 
and briefly discuss their interrelationships. 
 
3.1. Trust Definitions 
 
(Psychology slant) Trust in a person is a commitment to 
an action based on a belief that the future actions of that 
person will lead to good outcome [16]. 
 
(Probability slant) Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a 
level of subjective probability with which an agent 
assesses that another agent will perform a particular 
action, both before and independently of such an action 
being monitored [17]. 
 
3.2. Trustworthiness Definition 
 
(Psychology Slant) Trustworthiness is a collection of 
qualities of an agent that leads them to be considered as 
deserving of trust from others (in one or more 
environments, under different conditions, and to different 
degrees) [15]. 
 
(Probability slant) Trustworthiness is the objective 
probability that the trustee performs a particular action on 
which the interests of the trustor depend. 
 
 3.3. Trust versus Trustworthiness 
 
Trust disposition depends on potentially quantified 
trustworthiness qualities and context-based trust 
threshold. For example, in the context of trusting 
strangers, people in the West will trust for lower levels of 
trustworthiness than people in the Gulf [18].  
 
Trustworthy system produces expected behavior and is 
not susceptible to subversion. In other words, 
trustworthiness is the assurance that a system will 
perform as expected for sustained collaboration despite 
environmental disruptions, human and operator errors, 
hostile attacks, and implementation errors.  
 
3.4. Trust versus Reputation and Security    
 
(Community-based) reputation is the community or 
public estimation of standing for merit, achievement, 
reliability, etc.
2
 Alternatively, reputation is the opinion 
(or a social evaluation) of a community toward a person, 
a group of people, or an organization on a certain 
criterion
3
. (Cf., Brand-value, PageRank [19], eBay 
profile, etc.) 
 
Reputation can be a basis for trust. However, they are 
different notions, as illustrated by Josang et al. [6].  
 
 
Trust is local and subjective; reputation is global and 
objective. Security refers to resistance to attacks (on the 
trust management system). 
 
Reputation is overloaded in that community-based 
reputation differs from temporal reputation-based 
process. The latter elicits trust for sustained good 
behavior over time. 
 
 
4. TRUST ONTOLOGY 
 
A trust network is a data structure that abstracts and 
formalizes information relevant to describing trust 
relationships. A trust inference algorithm computes 
trustworthiness information implicit in a trust network.  
 
Consider the following fragment of English involving 
trust information for delegating work or responsibility, 
and its abstract representation in the form of a trust 
network shown in Figure 1 [1]. 
 
• Alice (A) trusts Bob (B) for recommending good car 
mechanic. 
                                                 
2
 Dictionary.com 
3
 Wikipedia.com 
• Bob trusts Dick (D) to be a good car mechanic. 
• Charlie (C) does not trust Dick to be a good car 
mechanic. 
• Alice trusts Bob more than Charlie, for recommending 
good car mechanic. 
• Alice trusts Charlie more than Bob, for recommending 
good baby sitter.  
 
Formally, a trust network is a node-labeled, edge-labeled, 
in-edge ordered, directed graph data structure. In general, 
the semantics of trust can be captured by specifying the 
meaning of the trust network in terms of how “network 
elements and trust values” relate to or compose with each 
other using logic, probability theory, statistics, or path 
constraints. Inference algorithms are efficient graph-
based procedures for querying or determining trust 
values.   
 
In order to better understand trust concepts and relate 
various approaches to trust in the literature, we have 
developed a simple ontology of trust [20]. The trust 
ontology, as shown in Figure 2, is more a taxonomy than 
a formal semantic specification. However, we can specify 
the semantics of trust in a rigorous manner by 
formalizing trust inferences sanctioned by a trust network 
as shown later. Our goal here is to provide a unified 
vocabulary to abstract, compare and contrast different 
approaches. The trust ontology describes in more detail 
the primitive trust information (trust metric) carried by 
each edge label. Specifically, it captures the type, the 
value and the means to acquire the value for each edge. 
Trust inference algorithms (trust models) deal with how 
to compose primitive trust values associated with edges 
to obtain aggregated trust values over paths and 
subgraphs as discussed in Section 5.3. The trust 
relationship is a 6-tuple:(trustor, trust type, trust value, 
trust scope, trust process, trustee), where, trust type 
represents the nature of trust relationship, trust value 
quantifies the trustworthiness for comparison, trust 
scope   represents the applicable context for trust, and 
trust process represents the method by which the trust 
value is  created and maintained. See Figures 2 and 3 for 
details. 
 
Trust Type: Trust type specifies the nature of the trust 
relationship. There are two trust types, referral trust (trust 
in belief) and functional/non-functional trust (trust in 
performance). 
 Referral Trust (trust in belief) – Agent a1 has referral 
trust in agent a2 if a1 trusts a2’s ability to 
recommend another agent. 
 (Non-)Functional Trust (trust in performance) – 
Agent a1 has functional (dis)trust in agent a2 if a1 
(dis)trusts agent a2’s ability to perform an action. 
 
 
I trust you because of your good reputation. 
I trust you despite your bad reputation. 
Do you still trust Toyota brand? 
 
 
Figure 1: Example Trust Network 
 
Trust Value: Trust value quantifies trust. This can be 
achieved using star rating, numeric rating, or partial 
order. 
 
Traditionally, trust between users is modeled as a real 
number in [0,1] or [-1,1]. This facilitates trust 
computation, but is too fine-grained and imposes a total 
order. As stated by Guha et al. [21]: While continuous-
valued trusts are mathematically clean, from the 
standpoint of usability, most real-world systems will in 
fact use discrete values at which one user can rate 
another. For instance, users often rate other users (such 
as vendors and reviewers) using star ratings. Epinions, 
provides a qualitative way of adding other users to a trust 
circle. Epinions, Ebay, Amazon, Facebook, etc. all use 
small sets for (dis)trust/rating values. We have 
formalized trust in terms of partial orders (that 
emphasizes relative trust) [1].  
 
Trust Scope:  Trust scope captures the context for which 
the trust information is applicable. We usually trust 
different agents for different subject matter or activity. 
For example, from Figure 1, Alice trusts Bob within the 
scope of recommending a good car mechanic.   
 
Trust Process: Trust process specifies how trust values 
between pairs of agents are computed and is applicable to 
both primitive edges and composite paths.  
 Trust process for primitive edges (i.e. for functional 
and referral edges): 
o (Temporal) Reputation – Trust values are 
computed based on past behavior over time. 
o Policy – Trust values are computed based 
on explicitly stated constraints. 
o Evidence – Trust values are computed based 
on seeking and verifying evidence.  
o Provenance – Trust values are computed 
based on lineage information. 
 Trust process for composite edges (for admissible 
paths): 
o Trust values are determined via propagation 
(chaining and aggregation) specified as part 
of the trust model. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Trust Ontology 
 
To provide a unified illustration of the trust processes 
consider hiring of a Search Engineer. A temporal 
reputation-based trust process is exemplified by the use 
of past job experience. A policy-based trust process can 
use scores on screening tests. An evidence-based trust 
process can use multiple interviews (phone, on-site, R&D 
team) for assessing the candidate’s merits. A provenance-
based trust process can consider the University from 
which the applicant graduated. 
 
According to Mayer et al. [22], trust is a function of a 
trustee's perceived trustworthiness and of the trustor's   
propensity to trust. The trustor's propensity/disposition to 
trust, which is their willingness to be vulnerable, is both 
scope/context dependent, and highly subjective. For 
instance, Paul English
4
 mentions four qualitative 
interpersonal trust dispositions:  (i) Suspicious still: 
"Don't ever trust anyone, even after they have done 
something nice."  (ii) Suspicious until: "Don't trust 
anyone until they prove themselves."  (iii) Trust until: 
"Trust people until they screw up." (iv) Trust still: "Trust 
people even after they make mistakes, sometimes even 
when they hurt you." 
 
                                                 
4
 http://paulenglish.com/trust.html (accessed 10/23/2012)   
In the rest of the paper, we use this trust ontology to 
understand the abstract similarities and concrete 
differences among various approaches to trust, and to 
organize them. For illustrative purposes, consider the 
following examples. Trust type is at the core of 
comparing and contrasting approaches to trust in sensor 
networks as discussed in detail in Section 5.1.3, 
especially because different approaches represent and 
reason with functional and referral trusts differently. 
Trust values take various forms as shown in Section 5, 
and require different reasoning strategies. Social 
networks and ecommerce sites use totally ordered 
discrete trust values (e.g., Golbeck [13], Amazon product 
and seller ratings), while Thirunarayan [1] proposes an 
alternative generalization to partial orders. In sensor 
networks, a trust value usually ranges over the unit 
interval [0,1] (e.g., [23][24][25]), while Josang [26] 
proposes the alternative generalization as a triple of 
values, standing for (belief, disbelief, uncertain), 
summing up to 1. Trust scope can be used to abstract and 
unify a number of approaches. Josang et al. [6] can be 
viewed as motivating different trust scopes relevant to 
understanding trust in ecommerce recommender systems, 
while Winkler [27] can be viewed as motivating different 
trust scopes relevant to virtual environments. Trust 
processes allow relating reputation systems used by 
ecommerce sites and reputation systems for sensor 
networks. Specifically, ecommerce sites aggregate trust 
in a vendor from different agents, while, in sensor 
networks, trust is gleaned by interacting with a sensor 
node over a period of time. These two approaches are 
logically distinct ways of aggregating trust that can be 
unified under the notion of trust process and in fact 
formalized similarly. In what follows, we use and 
illustrate the trust ontology concepts to organize and 
analyze various approaches to trust in different 
application areas.    
 
5. GLEANING TRUSTWORTHINESS: 
ILLUSTRATING  APPLICATION DOMAINS  
 
We illustrate how to glean trustworthiness in different 
contexts. Direct trust, associated with trust edges, refers 
to trust determined using firsthand experiences (possibly 
over a period of time), while indirect trust, associated 
with trust paths, refers to trust determined using 
experiences of others via referrals [1][2]. Also note that, 
in spite of the distinctions articulated between trust, 
trustworthiness, and reputation in Section 3, we have 
deliberatively used the terms ‘trust’, ‘trustworthiness’ and 
‘reputation’ interchangeably. This is to conform to the 
conventional overloaded use of the terms in the literature 
whose various senses can be easily disambiguated from 
the context.   
 
Section 5.1 details how direct trust, both functional and 
referral, can be determined using a large number of 
observations through reputation-based process. Sections 
5.1.1 and 5.1.2 describe the role of Beta-PDF in 
formalizing trust. Section 5.1.3 describes the various 
attacks that can befall a trust system. In order to illustrate 
the subtleties involved in trust computations, Section 
5.1.4 shows how three seemingly similar approaches for 
the same problem, which are based on the same 
mathematical framework, can actually differ significantly 
in the trust inferences that they sanction. This 
underscores the difficulties in developing a universal 
notion of trust due to “clash of intuitions” even in a 
specific domain, and our analysis brings to fore the 
precise nature of differences.   
 
Section 5.2 details how direct trust is determined using a 
policy-based process. For illustrative purposes, we cite 
several informal examples from Grandison and Sloman 
[4] and sketch automatic approaches used to glean 
trustworthiness of a Wikipedia article and a Web site. 
 
Section 5.3 discusses how direct functional/referral trust 
among interacting users can be composed to infer indirect 
trust among users that have not interacted so far (and so 
lack firsthand experience). Our summary abstracts from a 
large number of trust propagation frameworks available 
in the literature. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Example illustrating trust ontology 
 
5.1 Direct Trust: Reputation-based Process  
 
Direct trust can be inferred from a large number of 
observations made in two orthogonal ways: over a period 
of time or by several agents. Quantitative values for 
referral and functional trust in MANETs and sensor 
networks can be obtained using temporal reputation-
based process. Both qualitative and quantitative 
information for referral and functional trust in product 
rating systems can be obtained using community 
reputation-based process. We now motivate and discuss 
the Bayesian approach to formalizing reputation-based 
process that is in wide use.  
 
5.1.1. Desiderata for Trustworthiness Computation 
Function 
 
Initialization Problem:  How do we get initial trust value? 
Update Problem: How do we reflect the observed 
behavior in the current value dynamically? 
Trusting Trust Issue: How do we mirror 
uncertainty        in our estimates as a function of 
observations?   
Efficiency Problem: How do we store and update values 
efficiently? 
 
5.1.2. Beta Probability Density Function (PDF) 
 
Beta-PDF provides a satisfactory mathematical 
foundation for reputation-based systems. Specifically, it 
formalizes prediction of trustworthiness probability from 
a sequence of binary events. We briefly review Beta-PDF, 
its role and benefits, below.  
 
Let x be the probability of a binary event. If the prior 
distribution of x is uniform, then the Beta-PDF gives 
posterior distribution of x after observing -1 
occurrences of event with probability x and -1 
occurrences of the complementary event with probability 
(1-x). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Beta-PDF(=10;=10) and Beta-
PDF(=25,=5) 
 
Specifically, let a (potentially unfair) coin have 
probability x of coming up with heads, and probability 
(1-x) of coming up with tail. Suppose we perform (r + s) 
coin tosses and the coin turns up with heads r times and 
with tails s times. Then the Beta-PDF
5
 with parameters 
(r+1, s+1) provides the best estimate of the distribution of 
the probability x given these observations. Figure 4 
depicts two example Beta-PDFs – one for (r,s) = (9,9) 
and another for (r,s) = (24,4). 
   
In general, dynamic trustworthiness of a sensor or a 
vendor can be characterized using Beta-PDF Beta(,) 
gleaned from total number of correct (supportive)  r = (-
1) and total number of erroneous (opposing) s = (-1) 
observations so far, and the overall trustworthiness 
(reputation) can be equated to its mean: /(+). The 
Beta-PDF is intuitively satisfactory, mathematically 
precise, and computationally tractable, for formalizing 
direct trust from a collection of observations. 
Specifically, it addresses all our requirements as follows: 
 
Initialization Problem:  It assumes that all probability 
values are equally likely. 
Update Problem: It updates (, ) by incrementing  for 
every correct (supportive) observation and  for every 
erroneous (opposing) observation. 
Trusting Trust
6
 Issue: It peaks at the mean. The variance 
diminishes with the number of observations.   
Efficiency Problem: It stores/updates only two numbers.   
 
We have developed an application to determine trust in 
weather sensor data and inferences based on them using 
the Mesowest
7
 Weather Dataset for ~800 stations 
collected for a blizzard during 4/1-6/03. We used quality 
flags (OK, CAUTION, SUSPECT) associated with 
observations from a sensor station over time to derive 
reputation of a sensor by applying Beta-PDF [28]. The 
demo located at [29] is a visualization of the trust 
evolution. 
 
5.1.3. Comparative Analysis of Bayesian Approaches 
to Binary Trust 
 
We discuss details of several Bayesian approaches to 
binary trust based on Beta-PDF derived from experience
8
 
sequences and evaluate their robustness with respect to 
                                                 
5
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beta_distribution (accessed 10/23/2012) 
6
 Ken Thompson’s Turing Award lecture titled “Reflections on 
Trusting Trust” 
7
 http://mesowest.utah.edu/index.html (accessed 10/23/2012) 
8
 The term experience is used for equivalent terms such as action, event, 
observation, interaction, service, utility, satisfaction-level etc. Similarly,   
the term success and failure are used for good and bad respectively. 
the following well-known security attacks. These 
approaches can potentially be adapted to determine the 
trustworthiness of a collaborating partner using a 
centralized or distributed system. This discussion is 
meant to clarify their similarities and differences. 
 
a. Ballot-stuffing attack: Majority of the recommenders 
collude to unfairly promote the trustworthiness of an 
undeserving trustee. 
 
b. Bad-mouthing attack: Majority of the recommenders 
collude to unfairly denigrate the trustworthiness of a 
victim.   
 
c. Newcomer and Sybil attacks: In newcomer attack, a 
malicious trustee creates new identity to avoid detection 
by a trust system that tracks history of interactions. In 
Sybil attack, a malicious trustee creates multiple fake 
identities to exert undue adverse influence. 
 
d. Sleeper and On-Off attacks: A malicious trustee 
acquires high reputation/trust by behaving well for long 
durations and then behaving bad intermittently.  The 
sleeper attack is also called betrayal attack, and on-off 
attack is also called inconsistency attack. 
 
e. Conflicting behavior attack: In conflicting behavior 
attack, the attacker uses “divide and conquer” strategy by 
providing conflicting recommendations on a trustee to 
multiple trustworthy sources. When a victim seeks 
recommendations from these trustworthy sources, which 
faithfully transmit the attacker’s views, the victim ends 
up getting conflicting recommendations on the trustee, 
thereby causing it to incorrectly reduce its trust in a 
subset of trustworthy sources (recommenders). This 
hampers the overall “morale”. 
 
Denko-Sun’s Approach for MANETs [24]: Direct 
(functional
9
) trust in a trustee by a trustor is based on the 
number of success experiences s and number of failure 
experiences f witnessed by the trustor, and indirect 
(referral
10
) trust via recommendations from nodes 1 
through k is based on the total number of success 
experiences s
r
 and total number of failure experiences f
r
 
reported by the recommenders. Cumulative trust is 
obtained by summing both direct and indirect counts as 
follows: 
  (s + s
r
 + 1) / (s + s
r
 + 1) + (f + f
r 
+ 1)  
where 


k
i
r
i
r ss
1
and 


k
i
r
i
r
ff
1
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 Functional trust a.k.a. trust in performance 
10
 Referral trust a.k.a. trust in belief 
Each node maintains, for each peer (and for the implicit 
context of packet forwarding), these numbers. In practice, 
to improve security, it separates direct experiences from 
recommendations (which are indirect experiences), and 
separates recommendations from different recommenders 
even though the recommender identity is ignored.   As a 
result, it can weight direct experiences more heavily than 
recommendations and drop extreme recommendations, to 
improve robustness. This approach can overcome ballot-
stuffing and bad-mouthing attacks if malicious 
recommenders are a minority. It cannot deal with sleeper 
and on-off attacks, Sybil and newcomer attacks, and 
conflicting behavior attacks because it does not track 
recommender identity. 
Ganeriwal et al.’s Approach for Sensor Networks [23]: 
Recall that the (,) parameters associated with the Beta-
PDF can be obtained from success experiences s and 
failure experiences f as (,) = (s+1,f+1).  (sj
new
,fj
new
)-
values to compute trust of trustor i in trustee j are 
obtained by combining (a) the direct experiences (sj,fj) by 
trustor i with trustee j, and (ii) the indirect experiences 
(sj
k
,fj
k
)  by node k with trustee j weighted by (sk,fk), the 
direct experiences by trustor i with node k, using 
chaining/discounting rule given in [34] as shown below.   
sj
new
 = sj  + (2*sk*sj
k
) / ([(fk+2)+(sj
k
+fj
k
+2)] + 2*sk) 
fj
new
 = fj  + (2*sk*fj
k
) / ([(fk+2)+(sj
k
+fj
k
+2)] + 2*sk) 
Note that, while computing indirect trust, this rule 
modulates the contribution of a recommendation in 
proportion to the trustworthiness of the recommender. In 
contrast, Denko and Sun [24] ignores recommender 
identity completely. 
In Ganeriwal et al. [23], each trustor maintains, for each 
trustee (and for all experiences combined, irrespective of 
the context), the (s,f)-values. The approach does not 
distinguish between functional and referral trust (and 
hence, does not maintain separate context-indexed 
counts). However, it does modify recommendations from 
a node using the trust in the recommender as shown 
above.  As a result, this approach can overcome ballot-
stuffing and bad-mouthing attacks as proved in [23]. By 
decaying/forgetting these counts over time (using a 
multiplicative factor d
(t-t0)
, where 0<d<1 and t0 is the start 
time), it can be made robust to sleeper and on-off attacks. 
However, it cannot deal with Sybil and newcomer 
attacks, and conflicting behavior attack.  In contrast with 
Denko and Sun [24], Ganeriwal et al. [23] approach does 
not distinguish between different contexts (including 
functional and referral trust) and derives indirect trust by 
chaining a pair of edges using the discounting rule of 
Josang and Ismail’s Beta reputation system. 
Sun et al.’s Approach for MANETs [24]: Each trustor 
maintains, for each trustee that it has experience with, 
two separate direct trust: functional (for packet 
forwarding) and referral (for recommendations). In the 
absence of direct functional trust information in a trustee, 
it computes cumulative indirect functional trust by 
pooling multiple recommendations for the trustee, via 
paths obtained by chaining referral edges followed by a 
functional link. Sun et al. [24] makes at least four novel 
contributions among others: (i) It uses an information 
theoretic formulation to devise a non-linear map of trust 
probability in [0,1] to a trust value in [-1,+1], thereby 
amplifying the effect of changes to trust probability on 
the trust value at the extremes. (ii) It provides axioms for 
trust models and trust composition rules that satisfy these 
axioms, as explained in Section 5.3.3 and Figures 10, 11 
and 12. Effectively, it learns a local trust network 
dynamically and reasons over it using chaining and 
aggregation rules, which makes it more general than the 
approaches in [23] [24] discussed earlier. Unfortunately, 
Sun et al. [24] does not unambiguously specify the details 
of trust computation for arbitrary networks. Furthermore, 
we observe that top-down view of trust propagation is 
non-local (that is, meaning of a node is not entirely 
determined by the meanings of their immediate 
neighbors). (iii) It provides algorithmic details of their 
implementation for MANETs and an experimental 
simulation of it [24]. (iv) It analyzes various attacks on 
trust networks in depth and evaluates robustness of their 
approach to these attacks. Specifically, it overcomes 
ballot-stuffing, bad-mouthing, sleeper and on-off attacks, 
but not Sybil and newcomer attacks (which requires key-
based infrastructure to overcome), and conflicting 
behavior attack (which is susceptible to recommender 
trust vulnerability).   
In general, to deal with Sybil attacks, an orthogonal 
mechanism to generate and verify Security Tokens
11
 for 
authentication is necessary. 
5.1.4. Illustration using a Minimal Example 
 
In order to shed light on the qualitative and quantitative 
differences in the Bayesian approaches to trust discussed 
so far, we consider a simple trust network shown in 
Figure 5 that involves two functional edges (one between 
A and B labeled F(5,10) and another between B and C 
labeled F(25,5)) and one referral edge (between A and B 
labeled R(12,2)), where the pair of numbers  refers to the 
number of success experiences and the number of failure 
experiences respectively. As explained later, this example 
is adequate to surface the differences in the expressive 
power of the aforementioned approaches. 
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 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_token (accessed 10/23/2012) 
 
Figure 5: A generic, minimal trust network to compare 
and contrast different Bayesian approaches to binary trust 
Denko-Sun’s Approach [24]:  This approach was 
proposed for the specific context of MANETs. A node 
infers functional trust in another node by aggregating its 
direct experiences and the direct experiences of its 
neighbors. For computing functional trust of A in B, we 
consider the direct edge F(5,10) obtaining the trust value 
as ((5+1)/(5+1+10+1)) = 0.35. For the purpose of 
inferring functional trust of A in C, we consider the 
composite edge F(5+25,10+5) obtaining the trust value as 
((30+1)/(30+1+15+1)) = 0.66. 
Ganeriwal et al.’s Approach [23]:  In this approach, the 
context and type of interaction is not explicitly 
represented; only the total number of success experiences 
and the total number of failure experiences are retained.  
For the purposes of inferring trust of A in B, we consider 
two direct edges F(5,10) and R(12,2) to obtain the 
cumulative edge (5+12,10+2). This yields the net trust 
value as ((5+12+1)/(5+12+1+10+2+1)) = 0.58. For the 
purposes of inferring trust of A in C, we need to chain the 
direct trust T(5+12,10+2) with direct trust T(25,5) using 
Josang-Ismail discounting rule obtaining the effective 
number of success and failure experiences as T(s,f), 
where 
s = 0 + (2*17*25) / ([(12+2) + (25+5+2)] + 2*17) = 10.625 
f = 0 + (2*17*5) / ([(12+2) + (25+5+2)] + 2*17) = 2.125 
The net trust value of A in C is 
(10.625+1)/(10.625+1+2.125+1)  =  0.79. 
Sun et al.’s Approach [24]:  This approach represents 
both functional and referral trust edges faithfully though 
it maps probability p in [0,1] to trust value in [-1,+1] 
using the following mapping: 
T(trustee : trustor, action) =  
 if  0.5 <= p   
     then   1 – H(p)   /* 0.5 <= p <= 1 */ 
     else   H(p) – 1  /* 0 <= p <= 0.5 */ 
 where     H(p) = – p log2(p) – (1 – p) log2(1 – p) 
 
Figure 6: Uncertainty as a function of probability 
 
This mapping provides an information theoretic 
interpretation of trustworthiness probability. Specifically, 
the probability values 0 and 1 imply certainty, while 0.5 
implies absolute uncertainty. See Figure 6. This non-
linear mapping amplifies the effect of changes to trust 
probability on the trust value at the extremes. That is, a 
change in probability near 0.5 has less effect on trust 
value than the same change near 0 or 1. 
To determine functional trust of A in C, we need to chain 
the referral trust of A in B with functional trust of B in C, 
by multiplying their trust values.  The referral trust 
probability of A in B is ((12+1)/(12+1+2+1)) =  0.81 and 
the functional trust probability of B in C is 
((25+1)/(25+1+5+1)) = 0.81. Hence, the information-
theoretic trust of A in B is 0.3 and that of B in C is 0.3 
(obtained using the above mapping of trust probability in 
[0,1] to information-theoretic trust value in [-1,+1]). 
Furthermore, the composite trust of A in C is 0.3*0.3 = 
0.09 (obtained using the product rule). See Table 1 for a 
comparative summary, which shows that differences can 
arise in the absence of expressive trust networks and an 
objective theory of trust. 
Table 1. Comparison of functional trust values  
(from A to C in Figure 5) 
 Denko-Sun’s 
Approach 
(prob. [0,1]) 
Ganeriwal et 
al.’s 
Approach 
(prob. [0,1]) 
Sun et al.’s 
Approach 
(inf. th.[-
1,1]) 
Functional 
trust value 
from A to C 
0.66 0.79 0.09 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Direct Trust: Policy-based Process 
 
Grandison and Sloman [4] provides several informal 
examples of policy-based trust. Similarly, we routinely 
use training programs and certifications as the basis for 
inferring policy-based trust.  
 
A general approach to trust assessment uses (i) domain 
dependent qualities for determining trustworthiness based 
on content (data) and on external cues (metadata), and (ii) 
domain independent mapping to trust values or levels 
through quantification and classification [30]. 
 
For example, trustworthiness of Wikipedia articles can be 
assessed based on domain dependent content-based 
quality factors such as references to peer-reviewed 
publications, proportion of paragraphs with citation, and 
article size, and metadata-based credibility factors such 
as author connectivity, edit pattern and development 
history, revision count, proportion of reverted edits 
(including normal reversals and those due to vandalism), 
mean time between edits, and mean edit length. 
Trustworthiness can be quantified in a domain 
independent way using dispersion degree score that 
captures the extent of deviation from the mean. For 
evaluation metric, normalized discounted cumulative 
gain (NDCG) can be used to compare ranking based on 
trust levels (determined from trustworthiness scores) to 
gold standard classification. 
 
Another example is the estimation of a website’s 
trustworthiness based on the criticality of data exchanged 
with it. Specifically, each of the following pieces of 
information carries with it different level of sensitivity: 
email address, username and password, phone number, 
home address, date of birth, social security number, etc.  
Intuitively, a piece of data is critical if it is exchanged 
with a small number of highly trusted sites [31]. 
 
 
5.3. Indirect Trust: Variety of Trust Metrics and 
Models 
 
Trust between a pair of users/collaborators can be 
gleaned on the basis of their similarity, where similarity 
can be quantified in a number of ways such as using 
average difference in ratings, overall correlation of 
ratings, and correlation on extremes [32]. In fact, 
collaborative filtering uses similarity measures (such as 
profile-based, item-ratings based, item-category based) 
between a user and others to predict item-ratings by the 
user. This approach is items-agnostic and scales well over 
time with large number of items. However, it suffers 
from (i) data sparsity problem when a small number of 
items are common between users, (ii) cold start user 
problem when a user has rated only a small number of 
items, and (iii) copy-profile vulnerability where an 
attacker can create a targeted-user-like profile to 
manipulate recommendations. 
 
Trust-aware Recommender Systems (TaRS) use 
explicit/direct trust between users to predict 
implicit/indirect trust between users through chaining 
[33]. TaRS overcomes limitations of collaborative 
filtering because trust propagation improves coverage, a 
single trust edge from a new user can enable a user to 
inherit several “parental” recommendations, and fake 
identities are not trusted by an active user. 
 
5.3.1. Trust Propagation Frameworks 
 
There are a host of approaches in the literature that 
present trust management frameworks and formalize trust 
propagation along chained paths, trust aggregation from 
multiple sources, and overriding 
[1][34][21][35][36][16][26][36][37][38]. However, in the 
absence of an objective semantics of trust, it is very 
difficult to evaluate various approaches to trust for 
validity.  This is made worse by the lack of transparent 
examples of trust computations that show all the 
consequences of a specified approach. In a number of 
situations, it is possible to reverse engineer framework 
parameters to reflect any desirable semantics of a trust 
network, making the comparison of frameworks even 
harder.  
  
5.3.2. Trust Propagation Algorithms 
 
Broadly speaking, trust propagation algorithms work on 
DAGs extracted from potentially cyclic trust networks 
and fall into two categories: top-down and bottom-up. In 
top-down approach, trust value for a source in a target is 
predicted by aggregating trust values in the target 
inherited from source’s “trusted” parents weighted with 
trust value in the corresponding parent [2]. In bottom-up 
approach, trust value for a source in a target is predicted 
by aggregating trust scores in target inherited from 
target’s “trusted” neighbors weighted with trust value in 
 
(a) Same Interpretation       (b)  Different Interpretation 
Figure 7: Comparative analysis example: top-down vs. 
bottom-up  
 
the corresponding neighbor [38]. For instance, the two 
approaches cited above interpret Figure 7(a) similarly 
with q trusting s. On the other hand, they interpret Figure 
7(b) differently with the top-down approach being 
ambiguous about q trusting s, while the bottom-up 
approach concludes that q distrusts s.  
  
Figure 8 illustrates the TidalTrust algorithm where the 
trust computation is top-down and uses weighted 
averages. Specifically, T(E,Sink) = T(C,Sink) = 2, 
T(B,Sink) = (3*2+6*5)/(3+6) = 4, and T(Source,Sink) 
=(4*4+2*7)/(4+2)=5. 
 
 
Figure 8: TidalTrust Trust Computation Example 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Cyclic Trust Network 
 
Figure 9 shows a well-founded cyclic trust network and 
binary trust conclusions. 
 
5.3.3. Trust Propagation Rules: Axioms for Trust 
Models 
 
As explained in Section 5.1.3, Sun et al. [34] describes an 
interesting approach to trust computation by first 
providing an axiomatic basis for trust models and then 
providing concrete rules for combining trust values as 
reproduced below. 
 
Rule 1: Concatenation propagation does not increase trust. 
For example, to satisfy Rule 1, one can use T(A1,C1) = R1 
* T2 if R1 > 0 and T2 > 0. 
 
Figure 10: Illustration for Rule 1 - Chaining Trust 
 
Rule 2: Multipath propagation does not reduce trust. For 
example, to satisfy Rule 2, one can combine the trust 
values on the two paths as T(A2,C2)  = 
( R1(R1*T2)+R1(R1*T2) )  / (R1 +  R1), where the 
italicized values refer to the upper path and boldface 
values refer to the lower path in case one wants to 
consider different trust values. 
 
Figure 11: Illustration for Rule 2 - Aggregating Trust 
 
Rule 3: Trust based on multiple referrals from a single 
source should not be higher than that from independent 
sources. That is, T(A1,C1) <= T(A2,C2). 
 
Figure 12: Illustration for Rule 3 - Propagating Trust 
 
 
Unfortunately, the axioms have limited applicability and 
do not unambiguously specify trust computation over an 
arbitrary trust network. 
 
Beta-reputation system [39] chains opinions o1 and o2 
(where opinion oi has three components [belief bi, 
disbelief di, uncertainty ui]) to obtain discounted opinion 
o3 as b3 = b1 * b2, d3 = b1 * d2, and u3 = d1 + u1 + b1 * u2. 
 
6. A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO MULTI-
LEVEL TRUST 
 
Section 6 develops a Bayesian approach to multi-valued 
trust based on Dirichlet distribution. Section 6.1 
motivates the need for formal underpinnings by showing 
the downside of an ad hoc approach to multi-valued trust. 
Section 6.2 then provides the relevant Bayesian theory 
(Section 6.2.1), the data structures used (Section 6.2.2) 
and the details of a robust trust computation algorithm 
(Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4) by adapting the B-Trust 
approach of Quercia et al. [40]. For clarity, Sections 6.2.5 
illustrates the multi-valued trust inference algorithm on 
concrete examples, and Section 6.3 analyzes its 
robustness to well-known attacks. Section 6.4 succinctly 
depicts a comparative analysis of different approaches to 
multi-level trust, while Section 6.5 discusses the practical 
applications of multi-level trust. Section 6.6 covers 
application of trust to collaborative environments. 
 
Quercia et al. [40] generalizes binary trust metric used so 
far to K-level discrete trust metric, where K refers to the 
number of trust /experience levels.  This work is 
exemplary in the way it develops the entire approach, 
providing details of local data structures employed, trust 
formation, trust evolution, evaluation of security, and 
experimental simulation. Unfortunately, we discovered 
that the default initialization (that rightly captures 
complete ignorance of initial trust probability) and the 
given Bayesian trust evolution rules, which seem 
satisfactory when considered in isolation, destructively 
interfere with each other when used together. As a result, 
the trust probability vector remains fixed (incorrectly) in 
response to any experience sequence. The fundamental 
problem can be traced to the fact that traditional Bayes’ 
rule computes a conditional probability on the basis of 
already provided two prior probabilities and one 
conditional probability, while in Quercia et al. [40], we 
are also required to dynamically learn the latter 
conditional probability. Unless and until we find a 
satisfactory interpretation of an experience level in terms 
of its effect on trust distribution, and account for an 
experience level directly in terms of trust distribution, we 
will not have an acceptable/defensible model of trust.  
After developing several ad hoc fixes, we discovered that 
founding multi-level trust metric evolution on Dirichlet 
distribution
12
, a significant departure from the way 
Bayes’ rule is used in Quercia et al. [40], yielded an 
approach that preserved its strengths, while 
simultaneously overcoming its limitations as discussed 
below. We also review other approaches to formalizing 
multi-level trust using Dirichlet distribution including 
applications to MANETs, e-commerce and collaborative 
environments. 
6.1. Illustrating Limitations of B-Trust 
Approach using Examples 
We recapitulate just enough details of Quercia et al. [40] 
not only to illustrate its capricious behavior but also to 
provide a roadmap for how to describe a trust framework 
and its implementation. Specifically, we focus on 
functional trust and skip referral trust, whose 
computation also exhibits similar behavior. 
For a K-level trust metric, each node maintains locally a 
K-length Direct Trust Vector and a K x K Direct 
Experience Matrix, to store information about trust level 
probabilities and experience level counts respectively, for 
computing direct (functional) trust between a pair of 
peers for each context using Bayes’ Rule, as described 
below: 
Direct Trust Vector dtv:  Peers × Contexts × Peers →                        
   Probability-VectorK 
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10/23/2012) 
That is, dtv(x,c,y) = (d1,d2,…,dK) where di = Probability 
that x has direct trust at level i in y in context c. (By 
definition, d1 + … + dK = 1.) 
Direct Experience Matrix dem:  Peers × Contexts × 
Peers →    Count-MatrixKxK  
That is, dem(x,c,y) = ((ec11,…,ec1K),…,(ecK1,…,ecKK)) 
where ecij = Count of x’s experience at level j with y on 
the basis of direct trust at level i in context c.    
To reflect complete ignorance via uniform distribution, 
we set the probability vector to (1/K,…,1/K) making all 
trust levels equally likely to start with, and we set all the 
elements of the matrix dem to the same value for 
uniformity (where the initial magnitude determines the 
duration of persistence of the bootstrapping phase and is 
irrelevant for the problem we wish to discuss). 
Trust Update:  According to Quercia et al. [40], the direct 
experience matrix is changed in response to new 
experiences, and the direct trust vector is recomputed to 
reflect these changes.  The probabilities are updated by 
applying Bayes’ rule, where DE refers to the current level 
of direct experience of x while interacting with y, with 
current trust level of DT in context c: 
p(DE(x,c,y) = j, DT(x,c,y) = i) 
=       p(DE(x,c,y) = j | DT(x,c,y) = i) * p(DT(x,c,y) = i) 
=       p(DT(x,c,y) = i | DE(x,c,y) = j) * p(DE(x,c,y) = j) 
Renaming p(DT(x,c,y) = i) as prior-prob-for-xcy-i 
and p(DT(x,c,y) = i | DE(x,c,y) = j) as posterior-prob-
for-xcy-i, the equation can be rearranged as a Bayesian 
inference/update rule:  
p(DE(x,c,y) = j | DT(x,c,y) = i) *  prior-prob-for-xcy-i   =    
 posterior-prob-for-xcy-i * p(DE(x,c,y) = j) 
 
posterior-prob-for-xcy-i  =  prior-prob-for-xcy-i  * 
 [ p(DE(x,c,y) = j | DT(x,c,y) = i)  /  p(DE(x,c,y) = j) ] 
 
The quantity posterior-prob-for-xcy-i corresponds 
to the inferred probability that the direct trust of x in y is 
at level i subsequent to the direct experience at level j.  
The exact computation of the various probabilities 
can be expressed in terms of the counts [39]. Note that 
the probability p(DE(x,c,y) = j | DT(x,c,y) = i) is 
determined by row i of the count-matrix dem, and the 
probability p(DE(x,c,y) = j) is determined as a prior 
probability weighted summation of each row’s 
contribution. 
)ec/(ec   =   i) = y)c,DT(x, | j = y)c,p(DE(x,
1
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where,   dtv(x,c,y) = (d1,d2,…,dK) and 
dem(x,c,y) = ((ec11,…,ec1K),…,(ecK1,…,ecKK)) 
 
Experience Update: In response to x’s direct experience 
with y at level j, each entry in column j of dem is updated 
as follows: for i in [1,K]: ecij = ecij + dtvi. (Equivalently, 
ec[i,j] = ec[i,j] + dtv[j].) The rationale seems to be that 
because only trust probability distribution (as opposed to 
exact direct trust level) is available, we can distribute the 
1-unit of direct experience at level j among column j 
entries in proportion to the trust distribution, as a way to 
assimilate new experience. Unfortunately, for the given 
row-symmetric initializations (that is, 
dtv(x,c,y)=(1/K,…1/K) and dem=((1,…1),…,(1,…,1)), or 
for all i: di = 1/K and for all i,j: ecij = 1) and the proposed 
row-symmetric updates, the Bayesian inference leaves 
direct trust vector value unaltered irrespective of the 
level of experience. For example, for K = 4 and initial 
trust vector dtv=(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25), all experience 
level sequences [1,1,1], [1,4,1,4], [1, 1, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1], 
[2,3,2,3], etc. leave the trust vector unchanged
13
 at 
(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25), which is intuitively unsatisfactory. 
In other words, the nature of experience sequence has no 
impact on the trust level, which defeats the original 
purpose of trust evolution. The root cause of this 
unacceptable behavior is the fact that Bayesian inference 
is founded on existing background knowledge 
summarized in terms of two prior probabilities and one 
conditional probability, while, in the approach at hand, 
we are acquiring background knowledge from scratch as 
we go along. Our ad hoc fixes to the experience update 
issue allows us to evolve trust probability vector in ways 
that reflect experience faithfully qualitatively (e.g., poor 
quality (low-level) experience leads to distrust (low-level 
trust)), but these fixes do not pass muster when its 
quantitative behavior is scrutinized. Instead, we 
discovered that evolution of multi-level trust metric in 
response to multi-level experience can be formalized 
satisfactorily by rectifying the Bayesian foundation to be 
used as described below. 
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 This result can be argued purely on the basis of symmetry and 
induction as opposed to performing numerical calculations. 
6.2. An Approach to Multi-level Trust 
Metric Evolution Based on Dirichlet 
Distribution    
Josang and Haller [41] were the first to formalize and 
analyze a theory of multi-valued trust by generalizing 
binary trust metric [39][23][24][24] to K-level trust 
metric using Dirichlet Distribution
14
 [42]. This approach 
evolves multi-valued trust in an intuitively satisfactory 
manner in response to experience sequences. K refers to 
the number of trust/experience levels.  For example, 
Amazon’s 5-star trust metric can be interpreted as 
signifying (very untrustworthy, untrustworthy, neutral, 
trustworthy, very trustworthy) or (very dissatisfied, 
dissatisfied, neutral, satisfied, very satisfied). The 
approach developed here formalizes a distributed, robust, 
lightweight, computational trust that takes into account 
context, subjectivity, and time, by adapting Quercia et al. 
[40]. Below we describe Dirichlet Distribution that serves 
as the mathematical foundation for multi-level trust (with 
emphasis on informal exposition of its formalization and 
applicability), local data structures employed for trust 
representation and reasoning, trust formation and 
evolution, and evaluation of its security. We also provide 
concrete examples of trust evolution rather than 
performing experimental simulation because the former 
provides greater insight into how trust evolves in 
response to an experience sequence, beyond mere sanity 
check on aggregate behavior that experimental 
simulations provide. As an aside, note that the entire 
development also provides a realistic (and pedagogically 
significant) illustration of the benefits of reusing a well-
developed mathematical theory as opposed to inventing a 
novel approach that may have lurking idiosyncratic 
behavior. 
6.2.1. Dirichlet PDF 
Dirichlet PDF provides a satisfactory mathematical 
foundation for reputation-based systems that use multi-
level trust metric. Let x = (x1,. . ., xK), where each xi is 
the probability that the trust is at level i, for a K-level 
trust metric. By definition, (x1 + . . . + xK = 1). For 
example, if Amazon 5-star rating system has 50 people 
giving 5-stars, 20 people giving 4-stars, 5 people giving 
3-stars, 5 people giving 2-stars, and 20 people giving 1-
star, then the 5-level trust metric probability vector is 
(0.5,0.2,0.05,0.05,0.2). The probability of an experience 
sequence e1,...,em, to occur (where an experience at level 
e is a realization of trust at level e, that is, the result of 
the implicit trust at level e and leads to an explicit trust at 
level e) is (xe1* . . . * xem).  The total probability of 
experience-level sequences, with c1 counts of level 1 
experience, …, cK  count of level K experience, is:  
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10/23/2012) 
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The i’s = ci – 1 are the associated Dirichlet distribution 
parameters. The first term corresponds to the probability 
associated with a single experience sequence satisfying 
the counts constraint, and the second term corresponds to 
the number of distinct experience sequences that satisfy 
the counts constraint (= total number of sequences / total 
number of duplicates). 
The Dirichlet distribution, which is the PDF for x = (x1,. . 
., xK) given parameters , is as follows (where, 
the -function generalizes the factorial function  for more 
general treatment): 
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Note that, for parameters (1,…,K) where each i – 1 
corresponds to the count of experiences at level i, the 
ratio (f(x1,…xK-1) / f(y1,…yK-1)) gives the relative 
likelihood of  (x1,…xK)  and  (y1,…yK) describing the true 
state of affairs. [Note that because (xK = 1 - (x1,…,xK-1) ), 
the plot of PDF in a K-dimensional space yields a (K-1) 
dimensional surface;  specifically a (K-1) simplex, which 
is generalizes a line (K=2), a triangle (K=3), and a 
tetrahedron (K=4) to K-dimensions .] 
If the prior distribution of x is uniform, then the Dirichlet 
family of distribution shown below gives posterior 
distribution of x after i-1 occurrences of level i 
experience with probability xi, for each i in [1, K]:
).,...;,...( 111 KKxxf 
 
In general, a posteriori PDF can be computed from a 
priori PDF to show that the shape (relative magnitudes of 
the various point probability densities) of the Dirichlet 
PDF is preserved by the outcomes conforming to 
multinomial distribution as follows (where un-
subscripted letters c, x, , etc. stand for vectors and the + 
operation stands for vector addition): 
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In Bayesian statistics, this property is captured by the 
statement:  The Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior 
for the multinomial distribution. This important property 
permits an efficient way to update the estimated 
distribution as a result of a new experience by just 
incrementing the corresponding parameter, without 
altering the structure/shape of the distribution. If the prior 
distribution is different from the Dirichlet distribution, 
then it will be conceptually hard to comprehend and 
computationally inefficient to compute the posterior 
distribution, in general. The fact that uniform distribution 
captures initial ignorance, and is a special case of the 
Dirichlet distribution, makes it a satisfactory starting 
point. 
Figure 13 shows a visualization of Dirichlet distribution 
using six combinations of (1,2,3) (K=3) via projection 
[43]. The three diagrams in the top row represent 
symmetric, uniform distributions concentrated at 
(1/3,1/3,1/3) to varying degree. The variation in the color 
signifies that as we go from left to right, our confidence 
in the estimated (trust) probabilities is increasing because 
we have more samples (experiences) to back them up. 
The first two diagrams in the bottom row show 
asymmetric situations with concentration points being 
skewed to the dimensions with higher proportion of 
samples. The third diagram in the bottom row cannot be 
realized in our application, even though the formal 
machinery can deal with fractional 's. 
The distribution of dynamic trustworthiness of a node can 
be characterized using Dirichlet-PDF() gleaned 
from total number of experiences (i-1) at level i, for all i 
in [1,K]. The best estimate for the overall trustworthiness 
(reputation) is the mean vector , and the 
best estimate for our confidence in individual mean is its 
variance as shown below: 
;     Mean(xi) = i/0 ; 
Variance(xi)  =  [i*(0-i)] / [0
2
(0+1)] 
 
 
Figure 13: Visualization of Dirichlet distribution: Six 
Examples  
 
6.2.2. Local Data Structures 
We describe the data structures that each trustor holds to 
store relevant information to compute direct (functional) 
and indirect (referral) trust in a trustee. (Note that trustor 
and trustee are of the same type Peers.) 
(1) Each trustor maintains locally, for each trustee and 
each context, a Direct Trust Vector, which is a 
probability vector of length K.  
Direct Trust Vector dtv:  Peers × Contexts × Peers →                        
   Probability-VectorK 
That is, dtv(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK) where di = 
Probability that trustor px has direct trust at level i in 
trustee py in context c. (As expected, d1 + … + dK = 1.) 
(2) Each trustor maintains locally, for each trustee and 
each context, a Direct Experience Vector, which is a 
count vector of length K.  
Direct Experience Vector (dev):  Peers × Contexts × 
Peers →    Count-VectorK 
That is, dev(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) where eci = Count of 
trustor px’s direct experience at level i with trustee py in 
context c.    
 (3) Each trustor maintains locally, for each trustee and 
each context, a Recommended Trust Vector, which is a 
probability vector of length K.  
Recommended Trust Vector (rtv): Peers × Contexts × 
Peers →     Probability-
VectorK 
That is, rtv(px,c,py) = (r1,r2,…,rK) where ri = Probability 
that trustor px has recommended trust at level i in trustee 
py in context c. (As expected, r1 + … + rK = 1.) 
(4) Each trustor maintains locally, for each trustee and 
each context, a Sent Recommendation Vector, which is a 
count vector of length K.  



K
i
i
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Sent Recommendation Vector (srv):  Peers × Contexts × 
Peers → Count-VectorK 
That is, srv(px,c,py) = (sr1,…,srK)  where sri = Count of 
trustor px’s received recommendations at level i in 
trustee py in context c.  Note that the identity of a 
recommender is lost in the process of aggregating counts. 
(5) Initialization: To reflect complete ignorance via 
uniform distribution, we set the probability vectors dtv 
and rtv to (1/K,…,1/K), and the elements of the count 
vectors dev and srv to (0,…,0). 
6.2.3. Trust Formation 
The overall trust vector can be obtained as a weighted 
combination of direct trust vector and recommended trust 
vector. The weight can be determined in terms of (i) 
confidence value, which is the variance of the vector 
elements from its mean, depicting intrinsic uncertainty 
(di – 1/K) 
2
/(K-1) and (ii) relative preference for direct 
experience over recommendations.  The former 
component is objective, while the latter component is 
subjective.  The trust decision required for action also 
depends on context-based trust threshold that takes into 
account subjective risk tolerance and mitigating 
warranties. 
6.2.4 Trust Evolution 
The direct trust vector should be updated for each new 
experience, and similarly, the recommended trust vector 
should be updated for each newly received 
recommendation. Because Dirichlet distribution is the 
conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution, we just 
maintain the counts of the direct experience and sent 
recommendations, and compute most likely estimate of 
direct trust probabilities and recommended trust 
probabilities respectively as shown. (For brevity, we 
focus only on computing direct trust. Computation of 
recommended trust is similar.) 
Simple Scheme (Bag-based): 
For a new experience at level i,  
 dev(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) is updated to  
 dev
new
(px,c,py) = (ec1,…, eci+1,…,ecK) 
and the corresponding dtv(px,c,py) is updated to  
dtv
new
(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK) 
where di = eci+1 / (ec1 + … + eck+1) and 
           dj = ecj / (ec1 + … + eck+1)  
           for each j in [1,K]  and j =/= i. 
 
To improve the robustness of the trust management 
system, (i) the trust is aged by attenuating the counts with 
time to reduce the effect of past experiences, and (ii) the 
trust is skewed using differential weighting of counts, to 
penalize low-level 
15
 experience (cf. failure) much more 
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 Low-level (resp. high-level) experience is synonymous 
with low-quality (resp. high-level) experience. 
than reward complementary high-level experience (cf. 
success). 
Robust Scheme (Timed and Skewed Decay): 
To incorporate differential aging of experience counts (to 
incorporate long term memory for low-level experience 
and short term memory for high-level experience),   we 
can use a decay vector (1,…,K), where 1 >= 1 >= … 
>= K > 0, and the modified update rules: 
 
For a new experience at level i,  
 dev(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) is updated to  
 dev
new
(px,c,py) = (ec1,…, eci  +,…,ecK). 
For every clock tick (with context-based delay),  
 dev(px,c,py) = (ec1,…,ecK) is updated to  
 dev
new
(px,c,py) = (1*ec1,…,K*ecK) 
 
For every clock unit and for every new experience,  
 dtv(px,c,py) is updated to  
dtv
new
(px,c,py) = (d1,d2,…,dK) 
where di = eci / (ec1 + … + eck)  
         for each i in [1,K]. 
 
(Subtlety: In our Python script that computes trust using 
robust scheme (not shown here), the counts saturate at 1 
rather than monotonically diminish to 0 with time, to 
reflect ignorance after long periods of inactivity.) 
6.2.5. Evolution of Trust Distribution for Various 
Experience Sequences  
In order to provide better insight into how the direct trust 
distribution vector evolves, we present final direct trust 
vectors for different experience sequences in Table 2, and 
trace evolution of trust distribution vector for a specific 
experience sequence in Table 3. We then highlight 
notable characteristics of this approach.  
Table 2: Trust Distribution Vector for Different 
Experience Sequences with K= 4 [1,…,4] and initial 
value (0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)   
 
Experience 
Sequence 
Final Trust  
Distribution  
(Simple Scheme) 
Final Trust 
Distribution  
(Robust Scheme) 
[1,1,1] (0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14) (0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15) 
[1,4,1,4] (0.38,0.12,0.12,0.38) (0.42,0.14,0.14,0.29) 
[1, 1, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 1, 1] 
(0.42,0.08,0.08,0.42) 
(0.5,0.1,0.1,0.3) 
[1, 1, 4, 4, 4, 
4, 1, 1, 1] 
(0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33) 
(0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17) 
[2,3,2,3] (0.12,0.38,0.38,0.12) (0.16,0.4,0.3,0.14) 
 
Table 3: Evolution of Trust Distribution for Experience 
Sequence (1,1,1,K,K,K,K,1,1,1) 
 
Exper-
ience 
Sequence 
Value 
Trust Distribution 
Trace  
(Simple Scheme) 
Trust Distribution 
Trace  
(Robust Scheme) 
 (0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25) (0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25) 
1 (0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2) (0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2) 
1 (0.5,0.17,0.17,0.17) (0.53,0.165,0.155,0.15) 
1 (0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14) (0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15) 
K (0.5,0.125,0.125,0.25) (0.5,0.13,0.12,0.25) 
K (0.44,0.11,0.11,0.33) (0.46,0.13,0.13,0.28) 
K (0.4,0.1,0.1,0.4) (0.42,0.12,0.11,0.35) 
K (0.36,0.1,0.1,0.45) (0.37,0.12,0.12,0.38) 
1 (0.42,0.08,0.08,0.41) (0.47,0.11,0.11,0.31) 
1 (0.46,0.08,0.08,0.38) (0.53,0.11,0.11,0.24) 
1 (0.5,0.07,0.07,0.35) (0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2) 
1 (0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33) (0.65,0.1,0.1,0.14) 
K (0.5,0.06,0.06,0.37) (0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2) 
1 (0.53,0.06,0.06,0.35) (0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17) 
 
 
Figure 14: Evolution of Trust Distribution for simple 
scheme 
 
Figure 15: Evolution of Trust Distribution for robust 
scheme 
Figures 14 and 15 depict trust evolution for simple and 
robust scheme respectively for the experience sequence 
shown in Table 3. 
6.3. Analysis and Security 
We analyze the characteristics and the robustness of the 
Dirichlet distribution-based multi-level trust management 
approach.   
(1) Symmetry: The formalization is symmetric with 
respect to each trust level. For example, for K = 4, the 
final trust distribution for the experience sequences 
culminating in (1,4,1,4) and (3,2,3,2) is 
(0.375,0.375,0.125,0.125) and (0.125,0.375,0.375,0.125), 
respectively, which captures similar trust distribution 
pattern. Note that the experience levels are faithfully 
“preserved” in the updated trust distribution, rather than 
smeared across trust levels. That is, complementary 
extreme behavior (credulous interpretation) is treated as 
different from ignorance (skeptical interpretation).     
(2) Effect of order of experience: The Simple Scheme is 
sensitive to the counts of various experience levels but it 
cannot distinguish their permutation, while the Robust 
Scheme is sensitive to the order of experiences and is 
dynamic. Specifically, the recent experience levels have 
more pronounced effect on the current trust level than 
prior experience levels. However, to control the rate or 
extent of memory decay beyond initialization requires 
context- and application-based tuning.  
(3) Differential aging of trust: The Robust Scheme ages 
the trust distribution by decaying counts associated with 
different levels of trust differently in response to clock 
ticks. This enables one to have longer memory for 
“failures” compared to “successes”, and more 
“successes” are needed to offset “failures”. To move the 
trust distribution closer to (1/K,…,1/K) due to long 
inaction, the experience count saturates to 1 over time.  
(4) Security issues: We analyze robustness of the 
proposed approach to various attacks. 
a. Ballot-stuffing attack: If a majority of the 
recommenders collude to promote a trustee that provides 
low-level experience, it can be countered only through 
more reliable direct experience that gets reflected as low-
level direct trust. Unfortunately, the low-level experience 
will be forgotten over a period of time. This is reasonable 
if the low-level experience is a result of transient 
phenomenon or occasional misbehavior, but is not ideal 
to deal with more persistent fault or malicious behavior. 
b. Bad-mouthing attack: If a majority of the 
recommenders collude to avoid a trustee that can provide 
high-level experience, it can be countered only if a trustor 
seeks direct experience with the victim trustee in spite of 
low trust and discovers a contradiction. This situation 
may be forcibly realized when trusted nodes are 
unavailable for interaction. 
c. Sybil and Newcomer attacks: The trust framework does 
not assist in preventing these attacks. Instead, their 
mitigation requires a separate authentication 
infrastructure.   
d. Sleeper and on-off attacks: The trust framework is 
well-suited to prevent these attacks as illustrated by the 
Robust Scheme, although it does require manual control 
over the memory window and selective weighting of 
different experience levels as a function of time and 
application, as shown above.  
e. Conflicting behavior attack: Recall that, in conflicting 
behavior attack, the attacker uses “divide and conquer” 
strategy and provides conflicting recommendations on a 
trustee to multiple trustworthy sources. When a victim 
seeks recommendations from these trustworthy sources, 
which faithfully transmit the attacker’s views, the victim 
ends up getting conflicting recommendations on the 
trustee, thereby causing it to incorrectly reduce its trust in 
a subset of trustworthy recommenders. The given trust 
framework does not track trust in each recommender 
separately (but instead, it lumps them all together). So 
ironically, because of this limitation, conflicting behavior 
attack does not have the intended effect of reducing trust 
in the intermediaries. The attack does degenerate to bad-
mouthing attack however.   
(5) Tracing vs. Experimental Simulation: We avoid 
performing any experimental simulation because it does 
not provide any new insight beyond sanity check. This is 
because if the simulation framework is set-up in such a 
way that low-trust nodes provide low throughput, and 
experiment always selects highest-trust nodes or nodes 
with a probability that is proportional to their trust value, 
to communicate, the overall performance is bound to 
improve. Instead, we have tried to trace and visualize the 
evolution of multi-level trust on diverse concrete 
examples, to get a better insight into its behavior. 
 
6.4. Comparative Analysis Tabular 
Summary 
 
The proposed multi-valued trust inference algorithm and 
its high-level relationship to several binary trust inference 
algorithms are summarized in Table 4.  In what follows, 
we recapitulate important characteristics of these 
approaches which also accounts for their robustness to 
various attacks as discussed in Section 5.1.3 and 6.3.   
 
In Denko and Sun [24], functional trust is aggregated 
using information from immediate neighbors and once 
removed nodes reachable through referral edges. It 
ignores recommender identity completely. As such, it 
cannot be as robust w.r.t attacks as the other approaches 
because it is unable to filter out referrals from just the 
malicious nodes. In Ganeriwal et al. [23], no distinction 
is made between functional and referral trust, and trust 
scope is not explicit. Thus, the computed trust and 
robustness to attacks are based on coarse-grain, 
cumulative trust, which is appropriate only in a single 
trust scope. Sun et al. [24] maintains separate functional 
and referral trust, and provides an axiomatic basis for 
their trust model (that is, for trust propagation via 
chaining and aggregation), which is robust w.r.t. attacks. 
Unfortunately, the axioms have limited applicability and 
do not unambiguously specify trust computation over an 
arbitrary trust network (a la others including Josang and 
Ismail [39], Thirunarayan et al. [1], Golbeck and Hendler 
[16], etc). Quercia et al. [40] generalize binary trust to 
multi-valued trust and separate functional and referral 
trust for different trust scopes. Unfortunately, the 
Bayesian formulation does not evolve the primitive trust 
values in a satisfactory manner. Our approach to multi-
valued trust, discussed in Section 6.2, improves upon 
Quercia et al. [40] by providing a satisfactory 
probabilistic basis for trust computation and evolution 
founded on Dirichlet distribution, and with  acceptable 
robustness characteristics as discussed in Section 6.3.   
 
Table 4: Comparative Analysis of various approaches to 
binary and multi-level trust 
 
APPROACH/ 
METRIC 
Trust Type / 
Context 
Trust Model  
/ 
Foundation 
Robustness 
to Attacks 
D[24] /  
Binary 
Functional  / 
One 
Trivial 
chaining / 
Beta-PDF 
Limited 
Ballot-
stuffing; 
Bad-
mouthing 
G[23] /  
Binary 
Functional / 
Indistinguishable 
Josang-
Ismail 
discounting 
/ 
Ballot-
stuffing; 
Bad-
mouthing; 
Beta-PDF Sleeper 
and On-off 
S[25] /  
Binary 
Functional + 
Referral            / 
One 
Limited 
chaining 
and 
aggregation 
/ 
Beta-PDF 
Ballot-
stuffing; 
Bad-
mouthing; 
Sleeper 
and On-off 
Q[40] /  
Multi-level 
Functional + 
Referral / 
Multiple 
 No  / 
Bayesian  
Ad Hoc 
Ballot-
stuffing; 
Bad-
mouthing; 
Sleeper 
and On-
off; Sybil 
Ours /  
 Multi-level 
Functional + 
Referral / 
Multiple 
No  / 
Dirichlet-
PDF 
Ballot-
stuffing; 
Bad-
mouthing; 
Sleeper 
and On-
off; 
Conflicting 
behavior 
 
6.5. Other Applications of Trust Based on 
Dirichlet Distribution 
The pioneering work of Josang and Haller [41] uses the 
Dirichlet distribution analyzed above as the basis for 
multi-level reputation system for e-commerce.  Their 
paper also presents: (i) A counterintuitive consequence of 
using uniform distribution as a prior on the rate of 
assimilation of experience sequence if the number of 
levels is very large (e.g., 100 similar experiences for an 
100-level trust metric leads to an expected probability of 
only ½ for the corresponding trust level rather than a 
substantially higher value); (ii) A better visualization of 
the results; (iii) Simple special cases that permit closed 
form solution for expected trust in the presence of trust 
decay over time; (iv) Different representations of 
reputation score; and (v) A potential practical application 
of multi-level trust to browsers by introducing a toolbar 
for rating Web pages by clients and for displaying 
recommendation summaries for subsequent use by other 
clients, similarly to the star-ratings (and reviews) 
provided on e-commerce web sites such as Amazon.com. 
This approach to ranking based on explicit client ratings 
has been called critical surfer model in contrast with 
random surfer model based on hyperlinks and intentional 
surfer model based on actual visits [41].  
Yang and Cemerlic [44] discusses the application of 
Dirichlet reputation to sharing resources among unknown 
peers in a collaborative environment, to minimize risk in 
usage control. Each requestor is evaluated for its 
suitability as a collaborator on the basis of directly 
observed behavior and (possibly discounted) peer 
recommendations (shared regularly among neighbors). 
The Dirichlet distribution is used to characterize multiple 
dimensions of an interaction such as being friendly, 
selfish, malicious, etc. The paper does not however 
explicitly specify deviation test or decision thresholds for 
multi-valued trust metric or choice of window-size for 
dealing with varying trustworthiness.  
Reece et al. [45] proposes a probabilistic approach to 
computational trust for multi-dimensional contracts with 
correlated dimensions (e.g., timeliness, quality of service, 
quantity, etc.) The work demonstrates that taking into 
account correlation among different dimensions gives 
superior trust estimates and makes it robust with respect 
to rumors
16
.  Specifically, tracking provenance of 
recommendation and separating recommendations as 
private and shared can avoid double counting in 
decentralized reputation systems. These ideas can also be 
applied to other frameworks such as Thirunarayan et al. 
[1].  
Fung et al. [46] adapts Dirichlet-based trust management 
to collaborative host-based intrusion detection networks 
(HIDN) (i) to detect intrusions such as worms, viruses, 
denial-of-service attacks, malicious logins, etc., (ii) to 
detect malicious/compromised nodes, and (iii) to improve 
security. For this purpose: 
(a) It segregates HIDN nodes into two lists: probation17 
list and acquaintance list, to ensure that 
recommendations are sought only from (mature) 
nodes with some track record. It length limits these 
lists using trust value and associated confidence for 
scalability reasons. 
(b) It uses both intrusion consultations 
(recommendations) and (novel) test messages to 
assess trustworthiness. The latter messages are 
“bogus” requests of known type used as gold 
standard to assess trustworthiness of a response, and 
effectively, the responder. 
(c) It uses Dirichlet-based multi-level trust model with 
forgetting factor, where the experience level is 
determined by discretizing satisfaction feedback 
computed from expected answer, received answer, 
and for a test message, its difficulty level. 
(d) It secures the trust system against well-known 
attacks. Security against Sybil attack requires 
additional authentication mechanism, while 
probation list and forgetting factor improves 
robustness against newcomer attack and betrayal 
                                                 
16
 In data fusion research, rumor propagation (or data incest) 
refers to double counting of recommendations from the same 
source via different paths. 
17
 Cf. Nursery in generational garbage collectors 
(sleeper) attack respectively. Dynamic test message 
rate secures against collusion (bad-mouthing) and 
inconsistency (on-off) attacks. Specifically, test 
message rate is increased when a node starts 
behaving dishonestly or has higher trust uncertainty. 
6.6 Additional Sample Applications of Trust 
in Collaborative Environments 
Grid and P2P computing systems enable sharing of 
computing resources. Traditional techniques to secure 
these systems include sandboxing, encryption, and other 
access control and authentication mechanisms. As 
discussed in Azzedin and Maheswaran [47], trust 
information can be incorporated into these systems to 
specify consumer preferences and requirements regarding 
resources and their producers for an application, yielding 
trust-aware resource management systems. Scheduling 
algorithms in such systems face additional load balancing 
challenges to deal with trust constraints. Azzedin and 
Maheswaran [48] evaluates a trust model for P2P systems 
that (i) supports multi-level contextual trust, (ii) 
distinguishes direct/functional and indirect/referral trust, 
(iii) captures dynamism through temporal decay, and (iv) 
successfully detects “bad” domains. Azzedin and Ridha 
[49] investigate “honesty checking schemes” for 
detecting bogus recommendations and assessing 
recommenders. This is analogous to detecting bad-
mouthing and ballot-stuffing attacks. They also consider 
recommenders that are inconsistent, that is, change their 
recommendation strategy. This is analogous to detecting 
sleeper and on-off attacks.  
 
Bessis et al. [50] and Brown et al. [51] propose a trust-
based cooperative grid  communities  using self-
led critical friend model. Functional trust in a node is 
obtained by taking the average of the product of 
functional trust in the node from a  common neighbor 
with the latter’s referral trust. The trust is decayed by 
specifying half-life. Critical friends of a node are 
neighbors that have a trust score higher than a context-
determined threshold. These are used to grow critical 
friends’ community for resource sharing and job 
scheduling. 
 
Trust is crucial for collaboration in pervasive 
environments [52] where an agent may encounter other 
agents in a distributed and possibly hostile environment. 
In Ajayi et al. [53], the access control policy in a 
distributed environment is a function of inter-
organizational trust. Specifically, the Dynamic Trust 
Negotiation (DTN) model supports dynamic allocation of 
security policies in collaborative environments. With 
increased growth of Virtual Organizations (VO) as a 
result of geographically fragmented, networked and 
independent organizations, resources such as IT and 
humans are shared by these organizations [54]. Trust 
plays an important role in assessing risks and choosing 
best collaborators. Trust has been a focus of research on 
virtual collaboration in distributed teams, e-commerce, e-
learning, and telemedicine. Interpersonal trust is also 
critical for cooperation among teams of scientists, 
technologists, engineers, and managers.  
 
Winkler et al. [27] present taxonomy of trust indicators 
(analogous to trust scope in Section 4) relevant to 
reputation of VO. Specifically, they formalize a Bayesian 
networks approach to reputation for trust indicator 
aggregation and trust update with temporal decay. 
 
There is contemporary interest in gleaning interpersonal 
trust from physical, linguistic, and behavioral features 
available through interactions, and influencing 
trustworthiness by manipulating/adapting external 
presentation and perception [15]. For example, van’t 
Wout and Sanfey [55] illustrates the effect of facial social 
cues on perceived trustworthiness and eventually on 
strategic decision making, while Wang and Emurian [56] 
explores characteristics that influence online trust 
formation, and applies that for the design of trust-
inducing features of e-commerce Websites. The study of 
cross-cultural differences in trustworthiness qualities and 
trust thresholds to better understand what aspects 
improve influence and what aspects flag manipulation is 
gaining importance is today’s well-connected world. 
 
The research challenges and directions outlined above are 
applicable to distributed collaborative systems because 
the collaborators that provide content and services are 
often remote from end-users and partners, and trust 
inference is essential for basing decisions in the absence 
of direct knowledge about each other.  
 
Rotter [57] defines interpersonal trust as expectancy held 
by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal 
or written statement of another individual or group can be 
relied on. He explores what personal traits, such as 
religious beliefs, age, need, and gullibility, can be used to 
predict trustworthiness, and how trust and knowledge of 
deception-related situations can influence specific 
behaviors in a given situation.    Yakovleva et al. [58] 
investigates interpersonal trust in various dyadic 
relationships such as virtual dyads vs co-located dyads, 
sheds light on the reciprocal influences of trust and 
empirically shows characteristics that determine 
trustworthiness (such as ability, integrity, and 
benevolence). It also shows that initial trust may vary for 
individuals based on propensity to trust, and in 
collaborative environments, reciprocal effects influence 
trust in dyadic relationships. 
   
McKnight et al. [59] discuss multidimensional nature of 
trust in e-commerce. For instance, they distinguish trust 
in a vendor to deliver on commitments, from trust in 
vendor's ethical use of consumer data, to trust in Internet 
communication being secure. (Our ontology tries to 
accommodate such distinctions using trust scope.)  It also 
explains and illustrates, in detail,  the nature of initial 
trust in an unfamiliar trustee, factors that influence trust 
formation such as characteristics of a trustee (such as 
competence and integrity) and trustor's  disposition  to 
trust  (such as faith in humanity and benevolence). 
 
Deception is the betrayal of trust, and ironically, trust 
makes us prone to deception. Knowing what features are 
used to glean trustworthiness can also assist in avoiding 
detection while deceiving. Deception is an important 
issue in the context of e-commerce, both from the buyer's 
perspective (caveat emptor) and from the seller's 
perspective (caveat venditor/mercator). According to 
Castelfranchi and Tan [60], in hybrid situations where 
artificial agents interact with human agents, it is   
important that artificial agents can reason about the 
trustworthiness and deceptive actions of their human 
counter parts. In fact, agents in virtual communities are 
and will be designed and trained to deceive, and people 
will be deceived by and will deceive artificial agents. 
Lappas [61] regards writing fake reviews as a form of 
attack on reputation-based system and provides an 
attacker's perspective on creating authentic-looking and 
impactful reviews (that can harm or boost an item's 
reputation as desired). Lappas [61] formalizes and 
evaluates impact and authenticity of a review (the latter 
in terms of the three factors -- stealth (which is the ability 
to blend in), coherence (which refers to the consistency 
between numeric/star-rating and the textual description) 
and readability (measured using Flesh-Reading Ease 
formula)).  Anantharam et al. [62] discusses a scalable 
and adaptive machine learning approach to detect 
topically anomalous tweets that propagate self-serving 
content using trending topics. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this work, we have provided simple examples to 
motivate practical trust issues, explained salient features 
that characterize trust and distinguished it from related 
concepts such as trustworthiness, reputation, security, 
belief, etc. We have also discussed our trust ontology to 
situate different approaches in the literature, and showed 
illustrative examples of gleaning trustworthiness. Finally, 
we touched upon some research challenges for modeling 
trust and inferring trustworthiness in the context of 
interpersonal, sensor and social networks, and 
collaborative systems.  
 
Due to the practical significance of Bayesian approaches 
to automatic trust prediction, we have presented a 
comparative analysis of various approaches to gleaning 
trustworthiness in machine networks (including ad hoc 
mobile networks, sensor networks, etc.) and their 
robustness to well-known attacks. We have focused on 
different trust metrics and types (functional vs. referral), 
data structures to represent trust networks and related 
trust information, Beta-PDF and Dirichlet distribution for 
direct trust computation, trust models for trust 
propagation and evolution in response to different 
behaviors. We expect comparative analysis to spur 
development of expressive trust networks that make 
explicit various choices or their resolutions objectively. 
Ultimately, the holy grail of trust research is to develop 
expressive trust frameworks that have both 
declarative/axiomatic and computational specification, 
and to devise methodologies for instantiating them for 
practical use, by justifying automatic 
trust/trustworthiness inference in terms of application-
oriented semantics of trust.   
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